Japan's hydra-headed disaster

日本祸不单行



The fallout

辐射余波

Some natural disasters change history. Japan’s tsunami could be one

有些自然灾害会改变历史，日本海啸可能就是其中之一



Mar 17th 2011 



THAT “tsunami” is one of the few Japanese words in global use points to the country’s familiarity with natural disaster. But even measured against Japan’s painful history, its plight today is miserable. The magnitude-9 earthquake—the largest ever in the country’s history, equivalent in power to 30,000 Hiroshimas—was followed by a wave which wiped out whole towns. With news dribbling out from stricken coastal communities, the scale of the horror is still sinking in. The surge of icy water shoved the debris of destroyed towns miles inland, killing most of those too old or too slow to scramble to higher ground. The official death toll of 5,429 will certainly rise. In several towns over half the population has drowned or is missing.

Tsunami是少数几个全球通用的日语词汇之一，这说明自然灾害是多么频繁地光临该国。但即使和它多灾多难的历史相比，日本今天的困境也算得上悲惨。里氏9级地震是该国历史上震级最高的，威力相当于三万颗二战时投向广岛的原子弹，紧随大地震而来的是席卷城镇的大海浪。随着沿海灾区陆续有新闻传出，人们渐渐了解当时的场面有多恐怖：冰冷的海水疯狂地涌上来，将震后的断壁残垣往内陆冲了好几英里，那些年纪太大、动作太慢而没有及时爬上高地的人们大多丧命。官方公布的死亡人数是5,429，这个数字肯定还会增加。在一些城镇，一半以上的人口都葬身海水或失踪不见。

In the face of calamity, a decent people has proved extremely resilient: no looting; very little complaining among the tsunami survivors. In Tokyo people queued patiently to meet their tax deadlines. Everywhere there was a calm determination to conjure a little order out of chaos. Volunteers have rushed to help. The country’s Self-Defence Forces, which dithered in response to the Kobe earthquake in 1995, have poured into the stricken area. NaotoKan, the prime minister, who started the crisis with very low public support, has so far managed to keep a semblance of order in the country, despite a series of calamities that would challenge even the strongest of leaders. The government’s inept handling of the Kobe disaster did much to undermine Japan’s confidence in itself.

在灾难面前，这个举止得体的民族表现出极大的韧性：没有抢劫；海啸幸存者很少抱怨。在东京，人们为了赶上纳税最后期限还耐心排队。处处都是冷静的人们，他们决意从混乱中创造一点秩序。志愿者迅速到场救援。日本自卫队在1995年阪神地震时迟迟没有行动，这次却反应及时，大批大批地进入灾区。地震之前，首相菅直人的民意支持率极低；虽然这一系列灾难会让最强的领袖也感到棘手，但迄今为止他还勉强维持着国内的稳定。阪神地震时政府处理不力，导致日本的自信心大降。

The wider concern

更大的担心

The immediate tragedy may be Japan’s; but it also throws up longer-term questions that will eventually affect people all the way round the globe. Stockmarkets stumbled on fears about the impact on the world’s third-biggest economy. Japan’s central bank seems to have stilled talk of financial panic with huge injections of liquidity. Early estimates of the total damage are somewhat higher than the $100 billion that Kobe cost, but not enough to wreck a rich country. Disruption to electricity supplies will damage growth, and some Asian supply chains are already facing problems; but new infrastructure spending will offset some of the earthquake’s drag on growth.

眼前的悲剧可能属于日本，但它也抛出了最终会影响世界各国人民的长远问题。由于担心灾难对世界第三大经济体的影响，各国股市大跌。日本央行似乎已经通过大力注资平息了金融恐慌大讨论。初步估计，这次灾害的总体损失将比阪神地震的一千亿美元还高一些，但还不足以击垮日本这样的富国。断电会损害经济增长，一些亚洲供应链已经出现问题，但在基础设施方面的新增支出会抵消地震给经济增长造成的一些负面影响。

Those calculations could change dramatically if the nuclear crisis worsens. As The Economist went to press, helicopters were dropping water to douse overheating nuclear fuel stored at the FukushimaDai-ichi plant, where there have been explosions, fires and releases of radiation greater, it seems, than the Japanese authorities had admitted. The country’s nuclear industry has a long history of cover-ups and incompetence, and—notwithstanding the heroism of individual workers—the handling of the crisis by TEPCO, the nuclear plant’s operator, is sadly in line with its past performance.

如果核危机进一步恶化，这些估算可能都得从头来过。本刊付梓印刷时，直升机正对福岛第一核电站注水，为的是让里面储存的过热核燃料降温。该核电站已经发生了爆炸、火灾和核辐射泄漏——泄露程度似乎比日本当局承认的更严重。该国的核工业部门长久以来一直遮遮掩掩、无所能为，虽然个别工人表现出了英雄主义精神，但核电站的东家东京电力公司在处理危机时却一如既往地令人失望。

Even if the nuclear accident is brought under control swiftly, and the release of radiation turns out not to be large enough to damage public health, this accident will have a huge impact on the nuclear industry, both inside and outside Japan. Germany has already put on hold its politically tricky decision to extend the life of its nuclear plants. America’s faltering steps towards new reactors look sure to be set back, not least because new concerns will mean greater costs.

即使这场核事故很快得到控制，辐射泄漏最终也没有严重到损害公众健康的程度，它依然会对日本国内外的核工业产生巨大影响。德国曾做出一项有政治风险的决定：延长本国现有核电站使用期限，如今该计划已叫停。美国新建核反应堆的蹒跚脚步看来肯定会受阻，很重要的一个原因就是是新的担心意味着成本增加。

China has announced a pause in its ambitious plans for nuclear growth. With 27 reactors under construction, more than twice as many as any other country, China accounts for almost half the world’s current nuclear build-out—and it has plans for 50 more reactors. And in the long term the regime looks unlikely to be much deterred from these plans—and certainly not by its public’s opinion, whatever that might be. China has a huge thirst for energy that it will slake from as many wells as it can, with planned big increases in wind power and in gas as well as the nuclear build-out and ever more coal-fired plants.

中国已宣布暂停雄心勃勃的核电发展计划。该国目前有28个在建核反应堆，超过其它任何国家的两倍，几乎占当今世界核电扩建的一半，并且还计划再建50个反应堆。长期来看，共产党政权推行这些计划不太可能受到多少阻碍——当然更不会因民意受阻（无论民意如何）。为了满足本国对能源的巨大渴求，中国尽可能地多打油井，还计划大力发展风能和天然气，扩建核电站乃至火力发电站。

Thus the great nuclear dilemma. For the best nuclear safety you need not just good planning and good engineering. You need the sort of society that can produce accountability and transparency, one that can build institutions that receive and deserve trust. No nuclear nation has done this as well as one might wish, and Japan’s failings may well become more evident. But democracies are better at building such institutions. At the same time, however, democracy makes it much easier for a substantial and implacable minority to make sure things don’t happen, and that seems likely to be the case with plans for more nuclear power. Thus nuclear power looks much more likely to spread in societies that are unlikely to ground it in the enduring culture of safety that it needs. China’s nearest competitor in the new-build stakes is Russia.

于是就产生了很大的核难题。要保证最佳的核安全，你不仅需要好的计划和设计，还需要那种有责任感和透明度的社会——这个社会能建立得到信任并值得信任的机构。没有哪个有核国家在这方面的作为达到了人们的期望值，所以日本的失败可能更加不言自明。民主国家更擅长建造这些机构。但同时，民主又让一帮举足轻重而又难以说服的少数人更容易确保什么事情都不要发生，很多核扩建计划的遭遇似乎就是如此。所以，核能看起来更可能在这样的社会得到发展：它不大可能因为需要恒久的安全而搁浅计划。中国在核扩建方面最大的竞争对手是俄罗斯。

Yet democracies would be wrong to turn their back on nuclear power. It still has the advantages of offering reliable power, a degree of energy security, and no carbon dioxide emissions beyond those incurred in building and supplying the plants. In terms of lives lost it has also boasted, to date, a reasonably good record. Chernobyl’s death toll is highly uncertain, but may have reached a few thousand people. China’s coal mines certainly kill 2,000-3,000 workers a year, and coal-smogged air there and elsewhere kills many more. It remains a reasonable idea for most rich countries to keep some nuclear power in their portfolio, not least because by maintaining economic and technological stakes in nuclear they will have more standing to insist on high standards for safety and non-proliferation being applied throughout the world. But in the face of panic, of sinister towers of smoke, of invisible and implacable threats, the reasonable course is not an easy one.

但民主社会不应该就此对核能置之不理。它还是有很多好处的：提供可靠的电力，保证一定的能源安全，不排放二氧化碳——除了修建和维持核电站运营过程中产生的二氧化碳。说到危及生命，核能至今也表现得相当不错。切尔诺贝利核事故的死亡人数不明，但可能也有几千人丧命。中国每年都有两三千工人死于煤矿事故，中国和其它地方那些煤灰充斥的空气更是要了更多人的命。所以大多数富裕国家在能源结构中保留一些核能还是合乎情理的，主要是因为通过保持核能中的经济和科技利益，他们就更有资格坚持全世界都采取高安全标准、都保证核不扩散。但在恐慌面前，在灾难性的烟柱面前，在无形的却又无法消除的威胁面前，这条合情合理的道路并不容易走。

Back to Tokyo

回到东京

No country faces that choice more painfully than Japan, scarred by nuclear energy but also deprived of native alternatives. To abandon nuclear power is to commit the country to massive imports of gas and perhaps coal. To keep it is to face and overcome a national trauma and to accept a small but real risk of another disaster.

没有哪个面临这种选择的国家比日本更痛苦的了：它不仅因核能而伤痕累累，而且也没有选择本土替代性能源的余地。放弃核能，该国以后就要大量进口天然气，也许还要进口煤。保留核能，该国就要面对和克服一场国家灾难，同时承担将来再发生一场灾难的风险——这种风险虽然不大，但却真实存在。

Japan’s all too frequent experience of calamity suggests that such events are often followed by great change. After the earthquake of 1923, it turned to militarism. After its defeat in the second world war, and the dropping of the atom bombs, it espoused peaceful growth. The Kobe earthquake reinforced Japan’s recent turning in on itself.

纵观日本这些过于频繁的灾难，我们发现，日本经常在这些事件之后发生巨变。1923年地震后，日本走上军国主义的道路。二战失败和遭受原子弹袭击后，它开始信奉和平发展。阪神地震促使日本走上最近的孤立主义道路。

This new catastrophe seems likely to have a similarly huge impact on the nation’s psyche. It may be that the Japanese people’s impressive response to disaster, and the rest of the world’s awe in the face of their stoicism, restores the self-confidence the country so badly needs. It may be that the failings of its secretive system of governance, exemplified by the shoddy management of its nuclear plants, lead to more demands for political reform. As long as Mr. Kan can convince the public that the government’s information on radiation is trustworthy, and that it can ease the cold and hunger of tsunami survivors, his hand may be strengthened to further liberalize Japan. Or it may be that things take a darker turn.

这场新灾难有可能对日本人的心智产生相似的巨大影响。可能日本人民面对灾难时的镇定和世界其它国家对此而产生的敬畏让该国重拾其迫切需要的自信。也可能日本秘密管理体系的失败——对核电站的无方管理正是其例证——会导致要求政治改革的呼声更大。只要菅直人先生能说服民众，政府关于辐射的信息是可信的，政府也能够缓解海啸幸存者饥寒交迫的状况，他可能就会更有能力进一步解放日本。或者事情会变得更糟。

The stakes are high. Japan—a despondent country with a dysfunctional political system—badly needs change. It seems just possible that, looking back from a safe distance, Japan’s people will regard this dreadful moment not just as a time of death, grief and mourning, but also as a time of rebirth.

其中风险太大了。日本——一个政治体系周转不灵而又万分沮丧的国家——迫切需要改变。看起来确实有可能的是，将来日本人民回头看这场危机的时候会认为，这个黑暗时刻不仅带来了死亡、悲痛和哀悼，同时也是重生的机会。